Security

@async/cli runs JavaScript and TypeScript command files with the current

user's privileges. Command authors and users should treat a command the same

way they treat a package script or Makefile target.

Command trust

The user-global command root is trusted operator-owned configuration. Local

.cli overlays are untrusted until the user approves their complete content

with cli --trust. The recorded digest includes regular files, symlink paths,

and the contents of symlinked files and directories. Cyclic directory links

are rejected. Any covered content change blocks local execution until the

overlay is reviewed and trusted again.

ASYNC_CLI_TRUST=off deliberately disables this boundary and is intended only

for controlled environments.

The installed cli and async-cli binaries run through Node 24+. Deno 2.7+ is

supported by launching the published CLI with deno run -A. The -A flag

disables Deno's sandbox and gives the CLI and selected command the same

current-user privileges as the Node path. Do not treat Deno hosting as an

additional isolation boundary.

The runtime host applies to the whole invocation. The router does not select a

different runtime from a script extension, shebang, configuration file, or

installed executable. Local-overlay trust is checked before command execution

under either host.

cli --list --json, cli --which, help, completions, and doctor inspect the

live command trees without executing scripts or requiring overlay trust.

Machine consumers should use cli --list --json for command discovery and

invoke commands explicitly through cli <words...> [args...], where the same

trust gate applies as for interactive use.

Please report suspected vulnerabilities through the repository's private

security advisory flow rather than a public issue.